Front Forum: discussing The Great War 1914-18

Robert, I look forward to the post in the French doctrine thread.
Chris, Schlieffen had a problem to solve of how to fight on two fronts. He needed a speedy victory in one of them so that he could then concentrate on the other. This was not to be a long war. He saw that even though the Russian army was very poorly led and, at his time, had just been trounced by the Japanese, they had endless country into which they could retreat. No speedy victory could be hoped for there. Turning to the other foe, he saw that the Western French- German frontier was heavily fortified and there could be no quick breakthrough guaranteed. His idea then was to pin the French at their fortresses and send another army on a wide wheel through Holland and Belgium as far as the Channel. They were to invest all fortresses such as Liege and Maubeuge where they could not be immediately taken by storm. This was to be done by reserves who were also to provide rear echelon transport guards. The fighting to be done by active troops. After taking Paris, the French armies were to be pinned between the Western frontier with the German defence there and the advancing armies. THis would deny them escape to the south and west of France and force a victory with a battle of annihilation of the French forces. Now the Germans could entrain for the War on the Eastern front which had been held by a skeleton force who would have fallen back as far as necessary in a holding action against the Russians.
That is the Schlieffen plan. We know what the Moltke plan was.
The general consensus by any staff who looked at the European situation was that Germany would have to attack through Belgium. That could be done in many different ways. Plan 17 expected them to come through the Belgian Ardennes. That is, south of the Meuse. Certainly there were common elements in the two plans but I believe not enough to call Moltke's plan by Schlieffen's name. Incidentally, even von Moltke changed his mind as the action unfolded and allowed alterations to the advance. A major one being the decision to swing inside Paris rather than envelop it.

Hi Tom,

Your points are well taken and I agree with the general thrust of them. I think we are arguing about oranges and lemons.

The point I was trying to make was the concept of operations in both Schleiffein's memorandum and Moltk'e execution in 1914 was similar. That is, attack France first by swinging through Belgium around the left wing of the French Army with a powerful German right wing, falling back on the German left and and trapping the French between the two wings. Hold with a small force in the east and when France is defeated transfer the main weight to the Russian front. Whether we call it a concept of operations or a memorandum, it is in effect an outline plan.

I fully agree that the details Schleiffin envisaged to execute the concept and those that Moltke put into effect on the outbreak of war where different in several aspects, but the broad concept was the same. Thus the point I was making was that Molke's plan was very much rooted in Schleiffin's concept of operations and in this sense the outline plan was Schleiffin's. This is perhaps why it is known as the Schleiffin Plan, although the details of execution were different in the version executed in 1914 by Moltke. Perhaps it is Moltke's version of the Schleiffin Plan?

Part of the problem is many of the primary sources were lost in the Second World War.

Molkte certainly made changes as the campaign unfolded. The swing inside Paris, was one and the other was to allow the VI and VII Armies to go onto the offensive earlier than planned. The extent to which either led to the failure of the plan is a moot point and I think, possibly, too much is made of them in attributing causes to the failure. I think Tyng's view of why the plan failed is pretty much on the money.

Regards
Chris

Whatever he based it on, the decision to do what he did, as he did, was Moltke's. And like most military plans, it did not long survive contact without the enemy before being modified 'on the hoof' beyond recognition. It would be more proper to call the German invasion plan of 1914 'The Moltke Plan', then.

Tom has referenced and recommended Tyng on more than one occasion and I've always meant to read him - I must make an effort to actually doing so now.

George

None of us are in active disagreement on what the plans were and how they differed. We should not let the discussion bog down over the name of the plan. We'll be doing the angels on pins thing next. Mea culpa.
Perhaps of some interest is why the Germans called it the Schlieffen Plan. Here we are off into very treacherous ground indeed. Army politics, which, in a State run as Germany was, means politics at the highest level. Much has been written of the pre war government of Prussia and Germany. It requires a much deeper study than I have given it to understand all that went on.
What is apparent, is that von Schlieffen was able to form around him a fanatically loyal school of officers, mainly staff officers who served at all levels including the highest. An indication of the influence he had is demonstrated by the following. He wrote and published an analysis of Cannae, one of the classic battles and stereotype of a type of encirclement. For decades, no battle plan whatever its form could omit the mention of Cannae as being somehow the main influence. If it didn't have Cannae in it, it couldn't be a good battle plan. This strange aberration is mentioned by several authors. This degree of loyalty was used by the opponents of the different German CiCs during and after the war. One only had to demonstrate how a plan or action differed from von Schlieffen's teachings to show that it had to be inferior.

George and Tom,

Fair points.

I was fortunate enough to be given a translated copy of Schleiffin's book Cannae, courtesy of the US Army C&GSC, including all of the maps he produced to support the written content. It is an interesting and erudite discussion and having such a vast array of maps to support his narrative is a reader's dream in relating his discussion to the situation as it prevailed at the time.

The actual narrative on the Battle of Cannae which. as Tom has said, drove Schleiffin's view of the perfect battle (the battle of annihilation through encirclement), is only four pages. He then goes on to discuss the key battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon in a lengthy chapter and the rest of the book is devoted to a discussion of the 1866 and 1870-71 campaigns.

In summing up his views he makes the following comment:

According to the principle of Cannae a broad battle line goes forth against a narrower, but generally deeper one. The overlapping wings turn against the flanks, the cavalry preceding them, against the rear. Should the flanks be separated from the centre, for some reason or other, it is not necessary to assemble them against the latter in order to continue jointly the march for a surrounding attack, as they can immediately advance, by the shorter road, against a flank or rear. This is what Moltke called "the junction of separated units on the field of battle" and declares it the highest achievement of a general. It is also the most effective, and of course, the most risky. Most generals and almost all able commanders apprehend the danger of the units being defeated before their junction and zealously endeavour to execute the junction of separate units, and on the battlefield itself, but as long as possible before the battle. In this manner they relinquish the decisive result and must be satisfied with a lesser or with no result whatever. He gives examples of where this occurred and says Moltke would have experienced the one or the other had he listened to his contemporaries and subsequent critics and had in the beginning assembled the three armies at Koniggratz at the base line. and later still It is desirable to have, for any kind of Cannae the numerical superiority in one's favour. Moltke had to create it in 1970 ... Moltke held to the principle for which he had fought in 1866: no observation corps, no armies, where there is no enemy. All the 16 Corps were destined for France. He acknowledges A complete battle of Cannae is rarely met in history. For its achievement, a Hannibal is needed on one side, and a Terentius Varro, on the other, both cooperating for the attainment of the great goals. A Hannibal must posses, if not the superiority in numbers, the knowledge how to create one."

Regards
Chris

This is an interim report. I have just received a book which I ordered some time ago from the heart of the Matto Grosso and expected in January of next year. " The Marne 1914", Holger H. Herwig. Random House.
I have only started so cannot give a complete crit of the book but there is certainly enough new material to warrant a recommendation. I have announced it here because Herwig gives a good summing up of the Schlieffen Plan and all the issues related to it.

Thanks for the heads up Tom. Look forward to your critique of the book.

Cheers
Chris